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ABSTRACT
It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others 
that moral theory should reﬂect the convictions of mature moral agents. Hence, 
intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-considered 
moral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists oﬀer 
an empirically adequate account of our moral obligations. I do this by applying 
recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on the idea of a universal 
moral grammar to a number of claims implicit in W. D. Ross’s normative theory. I 
argue that the results at least partly vindicate intuitionism.
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1. Introduction
Ethical intuitionists like W. D. Ross adopt the common sense view that there is an 
irreducible plurality of types of ethically relevant considerations. They further-
more hold that there is no explicit method that determines how to move from 
facts about which morally relevant considerations there are in a given situation 
to a conclusion about what it would be right to do. In order to systematize our 
moral reasoning, ethical intuitionists provide an account of the types of con-
siderations that are ethically relevant.1 To do this, they introduce a list of prima 
facie duties that always count in favour of or against doing an action, even if 
their strength – that is, their ability to defeat other prima facie duties with an 
opposite normative valence – depends on circumstances. W. D. Ross counts 
duties of ﬁdelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneﬁcence, self-improvement, 
and non-maleﬁcence among them (Ross 1930, 21). Intuitionists believe that 
philosophers do not need to devise ingenious procedures or invent new rules 
to identify these principles; rather, they should focus on the moral principles that 
guide the common sense beliefs accepted by mature moral agents (Ross 1930, 41). 
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According to Ross, we arrive at knowledge of those principles through a process 
he calls ‘intuitive induction’: By reﬂecting on the fact that in several concrete 
situations, certain morally relevant features constantly count in favour of or 
against an act, we come to recognize the self-evident truth that those features 
are prima facie duties.2
A main challenge for this position is that intuitionists need to explain what 
justiﬁes belief in self-evident moral propositions. In response, Ross oﬀers a 
foundationalist epistemology: Our reﬂected beliefs concerning the contents 
of prima facie duties express a ‘moral order […] [that] is just as much part of the 
fundamental nature of the universe […] as is the spatial or numerical structure 
expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic’ (Ross 1930, 29–30; see also 
12f. and 24). The reason that appeal to common sense carries evidentiary weight 
is that our convictions serve as ‘the data of ethics just as sense-perceptions are 
the data of a natural science’ (Ross 1930, 41). For many, Ross’s foundationalism 
is the least plausible part of his theory, especially since he seems to assume its 
truth rather than oﬀer a systematic defence of it. Contemporary intuitionists 
inherit this unresolved challenge.
But even if a satisfactory theory for the justiﬁcatory force of moral intuitions 
can be worked out – a number of promising solutions have been suggested3 – 
this does not go the whole way in vindicating Rossian intuitionism. There is a 
related and equally important issue that has received almost no attention: We 
need an account of the content of those intuitions as well as the rule system that 
underlies them. If we take seriously the intuitionist claim that the commonly 
held convictions of mature moral agents are the ‘data of ethics’, the goal of such 
an inquiry must be a descriptively adequate theory of ‘what we really think’ (Ross 
1930, 102). There are two issues here. First, we need to know the content of the 
reﬂected beliefs regarding paradigmatic morally relevant situations from which 
prima facie duties can be derived. Second, we need to establish the moral rules 
that underlie those beliefs.
To defend Rossian intuitionism, the descriptive and the justiﬁcatory projects 
are equally important and depend upon each other. For without justiﬁcatory 
force, intuitive moral judgments cannot ground a system of moral rules, and 
without knowing what mature agents believe, a moral theory that is based upon 
our moral intuitions remains empty.
In this paper, I will discuss recent evidence for such an empirically adequate 
account of moral intuitions and consider whether the results are compatible 
with Rossian intuitionism. This requires a number of steps. First, I address two 
arguments that challenge the relevance of descriptive adequacy for Ross’s 
theory (Section 2). Then I discuss which empirical assumptions are implicit in 
moral intuitionism (Section 3). In order to test these, I brieﬂy introduce Noam 
Chomsky’s linguistic program and John Rawls’s case for applying the same meth-
odological framework to morality (Section 4). Following that, I explain the setup 
of John Mikhail’s empirical work in moral psychology and discuss how it relates 
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to Chomskyan linguistics (Section 5), and I present the moral rules and the 
account of moral deliberation that Mikhail believes can be derived from the data 
(Section 6). At ﬁrst glance, a comparison between these results and Ross’s theory 
suggests that his intuitionism fails to be empirically adequate (Section 7), but a 
closer look at the diﬀerences between Mikhail’s results and Rossian intuitionism 
reveals that either the diﬀerences do not undermine Ross’s claim of descriptive 
adequacy or they can be traced to theoretical disagreements between Ross and 
Mikhail (Sections 8–10).
2. Ross and descriptive adequacy
Before turning to the main question regarding descriptive adequacy, the claim 
that descriptive adequacy is even relevant for Rossian intuitionists must ﬁrst be 
defended against two challenges. The ﬁrst and more fundamental worry is that 
normative principles cannot be derived from a descriptive account of moral 
judgment. Ross himself was an adamant defender of the view that ‘right’ is an 
irreducible notion and cannot be explained in non-moral terms (Ross 1930, 12). 
Consequently, he was doubtful about the school of sociologists who ‘seek to 
replace moral philosophy by the ‘science of mœurs’, the historical and compar-
ative study of the moral beliefs and practices of mankind’ (Ross 1930, 13). He 
argues that this form of inquiry reduces moral beliefs to societal and historical 
circumstances, suggests a sceptical attitude towards them, and ignores that 
moral beliefs have truth-values. Even if granted, however, these points do not 
undermine the importance of descriptive adequacy for Rossian intuitionism. The 
purpose of analysing the well-considered judgments of mature agents is not to 
leap from descriptive to normative facts, but to make use of an epistemically 
privileged perspective that reveals basic moral principles. If it can be shown that 
those well-considered judgments enjoy an elevated epistemic status – a core 
Rossian claim that requires a separate defence – then the fact that the content 
of those judgments can be determined by ﬁnding out what those agents believe 
under descriptively characterized circumstances is in itself not problematic. It 
is also in line with other core intuitionist beliefs. Ross, for example, seeks to 
establish the superiority of his view by showing that it aligns more closely than 
competing theories with common sense, with what ‘seems clear’, ‘is plain on 
reﬂection’, conforms ‘to what most men (if not all) believe’, etc. (see, among 
other references, Ross 1930, 2, 6, 8f., 11, 17, 18, and especially 39f.). In one of his 
most frequently quoted passages, Ross claims that ‘it is more important that our 
theory ﬁt the facts than that it be simple’, and for him, the way to discover those 
facts is to consult ‘what we really think’ (Ross 1930, 30). Therefore, determining 
what common-sense morality consists of is part of the intuitionists’ project.
Second, it might be asked whether idealized judgments would not be a bet-
ter source of insight than those of actual agents, with their cognitive errors 
and psychological biases (for the claim that moral intuitions are systematically 
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distorted, see Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, 184–219). This line of attack does not 
question the inference from judgments made under certain circumstances to 
normative conclusions; instead, it asks what kind of adequacy is required for 
the judgments that intuitionists rely on. It is important to note that there are 
more than two options here: The extremes are well-considered judgments of 
hypothetical agents under idealized circumstances at one end and the unﬁltered 
opinions of everyday people collected in a random poll at the other. Intuitionists 
place themselves between those poles. Ross occupies a middle position by rely-
ing on the common sense opinions shared by his contemporaries, but adding 
mental maturity and careful deliberation as preconditions (Ross 1930, 29). He 
also requires that what appears to be self-evident to us must not contradict 
other ﬁrmly held convictions (Ross 1930, 41).4 This explains why intuitionists see 
no contradiction in relying on actual commonly held moral views while at the 
same time excluding the distortions that impact many of our everyday moral 
judgments. However, a challenge for descriptive adequacy is that it needs to be 
shown how an empirically informed account can incorporate these epistemic 
ﬁlters.
Once the need for descriptive adequacy has been recognized, it follows that 
many of the claims that intuitionists have so far believed to reﬂect common 
sense morality should be treated as hypotheses that need to withstand empirical 
scrutiny and that are potentially subject to revision.5
3. What empirical claims does Rossian intuitionism make?
There are three possible outcomes for an empirical study into the principles 
that underlie the common sense judgments of mature agents. First, there is 
a chance that no universally shared set of rules can be found; instead, diﬀer-
ent individuals or groups adhere to diverse fundamental moral principles. This 
would weaken the intuitionist assumption that there is one rule system that is 
shared among all agents. A second, less pessimistic outcome would still be a 
burden for intuitionism: This is that there is a list of prima facie duties that is sta-
ble across individuals and cultures but that diﬀers signiﬁcantly in content from 
the classical intuitionist picture. This would require revisions in the intuitionists’ 
normative account and might undermine some of Ross’s arguments against his 
utilitarian competitors. A third possibility is that a review of evidence collected 
by empirical moral psychology might conﬁrm many of Ross’s armchair intuitions 
and therefore strengthen his theory.
In order to ascertain which of these outcomes is correct, we ﬁrst need to 
formulate the empirical predictions that are implicit in Rossian intuitionism. 
After a method for analysing common sense morality has been identiﬁed and 
applied, the results can be interpreted and matched against the empirical 
predictions. Here is a list of central assumptions to which Rossian intuitionists 
subscribe:
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(1)  Despite disagreements about concrete issues, mature moral agents 
(implicitly) rely on the same fundamental morally relevant features and 
apply them in their deliberations.6
(2)  There is a plurality of basic morally relevant features (see the list of prima 
facie duties in Ross (1930, 21f.)).
(3)  Those features can be expressed in the form of prima facie principles: 
The moral rules determine whether the relevant features count in favour 
of or against an act, but their relative strength depends on context 
(Ross 1930, 19f.).
(4)  Mature agents can gain knowledge of prima facie duties via intuitive 
induction (Ross 1930, 32–34).
(5)  The principles that underlie the judgments of morally mature agents 
bear a resemblance to Ross’s list of prima facie duties (see above); 
minimally, the rules contain both consequentialist and deontological 
 principles (Ross 1930, 21f ).
It would be remarkable if all of these predictions were vindicated from an empir-
ically informed point of view. More realistically, even a partial match between 
these assumptions and an empirically adequate picture would testify to Ross’s 
highly reﬁned sense of moral imagination. For the purpose of comparing Ross’s 
assumptions with recent research in empirical moral psychology, I will ﬁrst intro-
duce some distinctions from modern linguistics and then show how they can 
be applied to morality. This is necessary since the empirical study of commonly 
held moral views with the most developed technical apparatus and the broadest 
empirical support draws its resources from Chomskyan linguistics.
4. Chomskyan linguistics and its application to morality
Chomskyan linguistics makes the case for a generative grammar, which is a 
set of rules possessed by all competent speakers that allows them to judge 
whether a sentence in a given language is grammatical.7 Two distinctions are 
relevant for understanding the kinds of rules that form the generative grammar. 
The ﬁrst diﬀerentiates between competence and performance. Competence 
refers to the linguistic knowledge necessary to understand and judge sentences 
in a given language; in contrast, performance describes a speaker’s actual lin-
guistic behaviour, which is also inﬂuenced by ‘grammatically irrelevant condi-
tions such as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, 
and errors’ (Chomsky 1965, 3). The goal of Chomskyan linguistics is to isolate a 
speaker’s competence. The second distinction concerns two kinds of principles 
that explain our judgments about language (Mikhail 2011, 19–21). Operative 
principles are those principles that explain our language use. The explanations 
speaker oﬀer for their language use are called ‘express principles’. Since com-
petent language users can – and, Chomsky argues, in fact do – make mistaken 
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assumptions about the principles that govern the exercise of their ability to 
speak a language, there can be discrepancies between operative and express 
principles. Given the goal of determining the rules that are necessary for mas-
tering a language, Chomsky is interested in operative principles. Hence, two 
important conditions underlie Chomsky’s formulation of generative grammar: 
He abstracts from performance in order to analyse linguistic competence, and 
he denies that people have access to the grammatical rules they rely on.
Although originally developed as a linguistic theory, Chomsky’s account has 
been applied to areas ranging from mathematics, music, and object percep-
tion to our ability to classify animals and plants (Hauser, Young, and Cushman 
2008, 109; Sripada 2008, 319). This broad range of application raises the ques-
tion of whether Chomsky’s account can also provide an explanation of moral 
judgments. In fact, the idea that the principles that guide our moral intuitions 
are structurally similar to the rules of grammar predates modern linguistics. 
Adam Smith, for example, wrote in a famous passage from The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments that
[t] he rules of justice may be compared to the rules of grammar; the rules of the 
other virtues, to the rules which critics lay down for the attainment of what is 
sublime and elegant in composition. (Smith [1759] 2002, 205)
Starting with Rawls, philosophers have suggested that Chomsky has formulated 
an empirical theory that can be used to test the analogy between linguistics 
and morality. Rawls (1971, 40–42) argues that our ‘sense of justice’ can be ana-
lysed using the same methodological distinctions that Chomsky draws. In recent 
years, moral psychologists such as John Mikhail have advanced the idea of a 
‘linguistic analogy’ by conducting large empirical studies of people’s judgments 
regarding a number of moral dilemmas modelled after ‘trolley cases’ (Mikhail 
2011).8 In line with Rawls’s predictions, those studies provide an empirical argu-
ment in favour of structural similarities between linguistics and morality. They 
also identify what the main traits of our moral grammar might plausibly look like. 
Even though Mikhail’s aim is to provide an interpretation of Rawls’s early work 
(Mikhail 2011, 10f.), which stands in competition with intuitionism, the results 
of his study can also be used to test the empirical assumptions of Ross’s theory.9
5. An empirically adequate account of moral judgment
In analogy with modern linguistics, two distinctions need to be made (Mikhail 
2011, 50–55). As in Chomsky’s theory, there is a diﬀerence between moral per-
formance and moral competence. Moral judgments are often aﬀected by factors 
such as fear, mistaken beliefs, time pressure, etc. In order to eliminate these 
distorting inﬂuences, moral psychologists aim to elicit responses under ideal 
circumstances. It is from these judgments that the moral grammar has to be 
derived. The second distinction diﬀerentiates between operative and express 
principles. Instead of relying on the often erroneous explanations that test 
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subjects oﬀer for their own judgments (express principles), moral principles are 
determined by analysing response patterns to test cases (operative principles).10 
An empirical account of moral judgment that is modelled after Chomskyan 
linguistics needs to incorporate those two distinctions. This is how Mikhail does 
it: He presents test subjects in a controlled setting with a range of hypothet-
ical scenarios that are modelled after Philippa Foot’s ‘trolley cases’, especially 
the scenario of the bystander and the footbridge (Foot 1967). The judgments 
people oﬀer in response to these problems are then analysed in search for an 
underlying rule system. Since the interpretation of these data is not based on 
the explanations that test subjects give for their responses, the analysis of trolley 
cases identiﬁes plausible candidates for operative principles. More challenging 
is the question of whether responses to trolley cases reveal moral competence 
or moral performance. Since test subjects are ‘disinterested third parties […] 
in relaxed settings where they have plenty of time to rely on all of their moral 
capacities’ (Mikhail 2011, 96), it can be assumed that the experiment tests for 
competence; In addition, their responses are ‘stable, stringent, and highly pre-
dictable’ (83). This provides at least indirect evidence that the data are free from 
distortions – for otherwise, psychological defeaters would be present in some 
test subjects yet not in others, resulting in ‘noisier’ patterns of responses. Also, 
in line with assumptions introduced above, the test subjects are, regardless of 
their age, gender, and level of education, unable to oﬀer explanations that are 
consistent with their judgments (Mikhail 2011, 110).
Reactions to trolley cases and their variations should provide insight into 
the process of moral decision-making in virtue of the fact that with a fairly 
simple scenario, they instantiate a number of central moral concepts such as 
the signiﬁcance of consequences, respect for rights, the means/end-distinction, 
and the diﬀerence between intended and foreseen consequences. Furthermore, 
the test subjects are required to judge the deontic status of possible courses 
of action, where the options are limited to unambiguous responses (allowed/
forbidden) that allow comparison of similar cases. This turns the abstract prob-
lem of formulating a descriptively adequate account of moral knowledge into 
the concrete task of ﬁnding rules which explain a set of specific judgments (see 
Mikhail 2011, 102f ).
Another feature of Mikhail’s test cases is the fact that they avoid conﬂicts 
between competing deontic rules. Instead, there is only one moral principle that 
needs to be taken into account in each scenario.11 This way, Mikhail avoids disa-
greements that are due to diﬀerences in how agents weigh competing morally 
relevant features against each other.12 Hence, the results of his experiments are 
limited to what morally relevant features there are, but are silent on how those 
features interact (for further discussion on the signiﬁcance of this limitation, 
see Section 10).
An important qualiﬁcation regarding the nature of the argument needs to be 
made. Even if the empirical evidence was as strong as possible, this would not 
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count as a conclusive demonstration of a linguistic analogy between language 
and morality. Given the defeasible nature of arguments based on empirical 
data, such an argument would only oﬀer presumptive and defeasible evidence. 
However, it has to be admitted that the data Mikhail uses as empirical evidence 
is far from perfect: to mention two problems, the sample Mikhail’s study relies 
on is not as representative as it could be.13 There is a further problem. For many 
test cases, a vast majority of participants share the same intuitions. In some of 
the scenarios however, a considerable percentage of test subjects diverges from 
the majority view.14 Both facts weaken any conclusion that can be drawn from 
Mikhail’s data. Despite these shortcomings, there is signiﬁcant agreement in 
most of his test-cases that can plausibly be interpreted as speaking in favour of 
an analogy between morality and Chomskyan linguistics. It is however impor-
tant to keep in mind that an argument that relies on Mikhail’s empirical work is 
fallible and certainly less than demonstrative.
In the Section 6, I will brieﬂy introduce the results of Mikhail’s study before 
highlighting some concerns.
6. Deontic rules
The ﬁrst principle can be expressed as a version of the principle of double 
eﬀect15:
An otherwise prohibited action, such as battery or homicide, which has both 
good and bad eﬀects may be permissible if the prohibited act itself is not directly 
intended, the good but not the bad eﬀects are directly intended, the good eﬀects 
outweigh the bad eﬀects, and no morally preferable alternative is available. 
(Mikhail 2011, 149)
The second rule is the ‘Principle of Natural Liberty’ or ‘Residual Permission 
Principle’, according to which an act is forbidden if it ‘has features F1 … Fn […]; 
otherwise, it is permissible’ (Mikhail 2011, 133). In other words, if a particular 
action does not fall under any rule speciﬁed by the moral grammar, the action 
counts as morally permissible.
As a third deontic rule, Mikhail introduces the prohibition of battery and 
homicide (Mikhail 2011, 133–137). Battery is deﬁned as ‘causing harmful contact 
with a person without her consent’ (134); both homicide and battery are done 
in a way that is either purposeful or knowingly (133f.).
The fourth rule is the self-preservation principle. Its purpose is to deﬁne the 
circumstances under which it can be assumed that a person would not consent 
to an action. In Mikhail’s formulation it states that ‘if a harmful contact with a 
person necessitates killing her, then she would not consent to it’ (Mikhail 2011, 
137).16
Fifth, the moral calculus of risk speciﬁes good and bad eﬀects and ranks 
them. Mikhail postulates three primary bad eﬀects in the ordinal ranking: death, 
bodily harm, and the destruction of a valuable thing (Mikhail 2011, 137–144). 
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Furthermore, according to this principle, values can be aggregated, e.g. the 
death of more people is worse than the death of fewer people. When comparing 
bad eﬀects of diﬀerent kinds (e.g. whether a death is worse than a bodily harm), 
the chances that the bad eﬀects will occur also needs to be taken into account.
Finally, Mikhail adds a rescue principle to the list. It prohibits failing to rescue 
an endangered person, although not at all costs: This duty is lexically ordered 
and subordinate to other principles, such as the prohibition of homicide or 
battery.
What form does the process of moral reasoning that leads to deontic judg-
ments take? In answer to this question, Mikhail argues that the deontic rules 
provide ‘necessary and suﬃcient conditions for assigning a deontic status to a 
given act or omission’. The reasoning can therefore be captured with the fol-
lowing schema:
A has deontic status D = A has features F1… Fn.
A has features F1… Fn.
A has deontic status D.17
Since the schema allows for mechanical application going from the features 
present in a given situation to the respective deontic rule, the agent does 
not need to be a human being but could, Mikhail argues, also be a machine. 
Comparing moral deliberation to the calculation of a chemical reaction, he pro-
poses that trolley cases (and presumably all moral problems) can be matched 
against a ‘periodic table’ (Mikhail 2011, 153–162) that indicates which elements 
(such as homicide as an end or means or a side eﬀect) a scenario instantiates.
7. Comparing the linguistic analogy with Rossian intuitionism
At ﬁrst glance, a comparison between the results of Mikhail’s linguistic analogy 
and Ross’s theory suggests that there a few things they can agree on. However, 
while both hold that all moral agents share a common set of moral rules and that 
there is a plurality of morally relevant features (Ross’s ﬁrst and second empirical 
claims), the commonalities end there. While Ross believes that these features can 
be expressed as prima facie duties (his third empirical claim), Mikhail’s schema 
leaves no room for conﬂict between principles (see Section 6). Contrary to the 
fourth empirical claim implicit in Rossian intuitionism – the idea that agents 
can gain epistemic access to fundamental moral rules – Mikhail denies that 
express principles allow insight into the rules that govern moral judgments. 
Finally, Mikhail’s list of deontic rules bears little resemblance to Ross’s catalogue 
of prima facie duties.
Does it follow, then, that ethical intuitionism fails in terms of descriptive 
adequacy? Before jumping to a hasty conclusion, we should consider whether 
Rossian intuitionists might be able to reject some of Mikhail’s claims and accom-
modate those they can’t reject. I will begin by discussing whether the data 
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commit Mikhail to denying that agents can know the content of the deontic 
rules, then I will turn to the diﬀerences between the lists of duties, and ﬁnally I 
will consider the question of whether the empirical evidence contradicts Ross’s 
claim that fundamental obligations take the form of prima facie duties.
8. The relation between moral and linguistic grammar
In Chomskyan linguistics, the distinction between operative and express prin-
ciples means that the rules of grammar ‘are assumed to lie beyond [the] actual 
and even potential consciousness’ of competent speakers (Mikhail 2013, 19). 
Does the same hold for morality? At places, Mikhail argues that analogously to 
the linguistic case, moral agents have no direct cognitive access to the content 
of their moral grammar (Mikhail 2011, 20). In later publications, however, he 
takes a more careful stand (Mikhail 2013, 5). There are indeed good reasons to 
be more cautious. In the case of linguistics, the fact that we have no access to 
the principles that guide our behaviour does not aﬀect our linguistic practices: 
Competent speakers do not normally face the need to appeal directly to the 
principles of grammar in order to justify their linguistic judgments. Things are 
diﬀerent for the moral case. Even though in most situations, mature agents – 
as their responses to trolley cases indicate – have no diﬃculty in dealing with 
moral problems, there are issues at the individual and societal level where even 
under idealized circumstances, people are unclear about their own judgments 
or disagree with one another. In these instances, progress can often be made 
by considering which moral principles underlie our judgments in less contro-
versial cases and then applying them to the problem at hand. For example, in 
discussions about abortion or assisted suicide, appeals to principles such as 
autonomy and human dignity are a familiar strategy for justifying one’s position. 
While it is reasonable to assume that people often err when reconstructing the 
rules that guide their moral judgments – this is conﬁrmed by Mikhail’s study 
(Mikhail 2011, 78) – there are also reasons to believe that with careful deliber-
ation, it is possible for people to access basic moral principles. If the rules of 
our moral grammar were always inaccessible to mature agents, it would not 
be possible to explain why Ross’s prima facie duties – which are supposed to 
be derived from ‘what we really think’ – bear a resemblance to Mikhail’s list of 
deontic principles (more on the comparison between the two below). Further, 
even where Mikhail’s moral grammar goes beyond Ross’s theory, his principles 
resonate with common sense and have long been discussed in moral philos-
ophy. The doctrine of double eﬀect, for example, was ﬁrst discovered when 
Aquinas reﬂected on the permissibility of self-defence (Aquinas 2012, II-II, Qu. 
64, Art. 7). The prohibition of battery and homicide, to take another example, 
is an undisputed part of common sense morality.
Still, this does not amount to the claim that there is no diﬀerence between 
operative and express principles when it comes to morality. The argument 
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merely suggests that there is no strict dichotomy: In most instances, stipulations 
about the principles that guide our moral judgments are unreliable; however, 
under certain circumstances including careful deliberation, mental maturity, and 
the absence of psychological defeaters, agents are nevertheless able to identify 
these principles.18 So the distinction is strong enough to support Mikhail’s point 
that as a methodological maxim, explanations of moral judgments should not 
rely on express principles, but at the same time there is enough room for Rossian 
intuitionists to insist that under the right conditions, we are able to identify 
prima facie principles.
9. The divergence between Mikhail’s deontic principles and Ross’s 
list of prima facie duties
As the Table 1 illustrates, Mikhail’s list of deontic rules only partly overlaps with 
Ross’s; in addition, each of their accounts includes rules that are not matched 
by the other’s account.
There are two points that taken together help to explain the divergence of 
the accounts without challenging the validity of either theory. First, neither 
Ross nor Mikhail claims that their account is ﬁnal. Indeed, Ross explicitly asserts 
the preliminary character of his catalogue of duties (Ross 1930, 23).19 It would 
Table 1 
1as Mikhail (2011, 25f.) stresses, there are further ‘elements of moral cognition’ that must be presupposed 
as part of the moral grammar, such as the basic principles of deontic logic and of ﬁrst-order logic, causal 
concepts, etc. since the present focus is on deontic rules, i omit those additional assumptions. Even though 
there is no discussion of the issue in ross, it is plausible that he also needs to presuppose these further 
elements. The same goes for the closure rule: since it is a second-order rule specifying the completeness 
of Mikhail’s list of deontic rules, i have not included it in the table. ross shares the same belief: for him, 
the list of prima facie duties speciﬁes all morally relevant rules.
2see Mikhail (2011, 167). although this principle, which Mikhail does not deem a deontic rule, does not 
directly correspond to ross’s prima facie duty of justice, which is concerned with the distribution of pleasure 
in accordance with merit, both rules can be taken to be motivated by the same concern: human beings 
are equal and merit the same treatment unless an unequal treatment is justiﬁed by a relevant diﬀerence.
3strictly speaking, the moral calculus of risk and the doctrine of double eﬀect do not belong in a list of prima 
facie duties, as on their own they do not oﬀer reasons in favour of or against an act. rather, they either 
specify what counts as a good and bad eﬀect or indicate under what circumstances otherwise prohib-
ited actions are permissible. i nevertheless include them here because they are necessary for explaining 
common sense morality, and insofar as ross wants to oﬀer a complete account of our moral judgments, 
he cannot ignore them.
Ross Mikhail1
fidelity –
reparation –
Gratitude –
non-maleﬁcence The prohibition of intentional battery and homicide
Justice The life of one person has as much moral worth as the life of any other2
Beneﬁcence The rescue principle
self-improvement –
– The principle of self-preservation
– The moral calculus of risk
– The doctrine of double eﬀect3
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require serious argument to convince either side to give up elements on their 
list, but the addition of new items should require less eﬀort since this doesn’t call 
into question those duties that have already been established. Second, where 
Mikhail and Ross diﬀer, they don’t disagree about the same phenomenon but 
rather focus on diﬀerent areas of moral discourse. Mikhail’s aim is to explain a 
narrow set of scenarios that involve harming or saving other people; ﬁdelity, rep-
aration, and gratitude play no role in the trolley scenarios on which his account 
is based. In contrast, Ross focuses on cases that consequentialism has diﬃculty 
accounting for, such as promising or duties of gratitude.20 Ethical problems 
whose solution presupposes, for example, the doctrine of double eﬀect or the 
principle of self-preservation are therefore not on his radar. Hence, it is possible 
that if Mikhail and Ross had considered a wider scope of cases, they might have 
come to the same conclusion regarding the list of fundamental moral principles. 
As it stands, the present disagreement between Mikhail and Ross therefore can-
not be taken to count against the descriptive adequacy of ethical intuitionism.
10. Are there prima facie duties?
A fundamental diﬀerence between Ross and Mikhail concerns the way in which 
rules interact in cases of conﬂict. As seen above, Mikhail’s picture of moral 
deliberation leaves no room for the weighing of competing moral principles: 
His rules serve to specify which features correspond to which deontic status. 
Once the presence of those features has been established, the deontic status 
is determined (Mikhail 2011, 91–93 and 124f.). No further deliberation regard-
ing the weight of various morally relevant aspects of the situation is needed. 
Any ‘machine capable of computing judgments’ can apply the rules: Mikhail 
compares the task of the moral psychologist to that of an ‘engineer faced with 
the task of designing [such] a machine’ (Mikhail 2011, 27). Trolley cases ﬁt this 
model. Even though in most of Mikhail’s variations, the action has good and bad 
consequences, there is a single principle that determines the right action. In con-
trast, it is a central part of Ross’s theory that conﬂicts of duties are possible and 
there is no general rule that speciﬁes how the principles interact; even though 
the same morally relevant features always count in the same direction (i.e. in 
favour of or against performing the action), their weight depends irreducibly 
on context. This is why Ross calls his moral principles ‘prima facie duties’. For 
Mikhail’s theory to serve as a model for Rossian intuitionism, it would have to 
be able to handle cases where moral principles conﬂict, and a theory modelled 
on a device that computes deontic verdicts from ﬁxed rules is unable to achieve 
that.21 Alternatively, Rossian intuitionists would have to give up a central tenet 
of their view.
Zimmerman challenges Mikhail on this point. In one of his examples, the 
doctrine of double eﬀect applies but is trumped by a competing moral con-
sideration (Zimmerman 2013, 12f ). There, the killing of a person is necessary 
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in order to save a very large number of other people. Many would judge this 
act as permissible, even though it is forbidden according to the doctrine of 
double eﬀect since the bad eﬀect is not merely foreseen, but also intended. 
In order to accommodate these kinds of cases, Mikhail’s deontic rules should, 
as Zimmermann argues, be given a ‘comparative form’ (Zimmerman 2013, 13), 
which would allow them to be weighed against other relevant normative con-
siderations before arriving at an all-things-considered judgment.
In response, Mikhail argues that counterexamples such as Zimmerman’s 
should be treated as special cases that have to be codiﬁed as part of the moral 
principle (Mikhail 2013, 16–19).22 This way, their occurrence will become an 
instantiation of the rule and cease to be a counterexample.23
This approach reduces the serious challenge that Mikhail’s moral grammar 
hypothesis is built on the wrong kind of rules to the already familiar and solvable 
issue that, in order to do justice to a larger set of cases, he needs more ﬁne-
grained principles. This move, however, comes at a cost. In order to solve the 
problem, the procedure has to be repeated for every possible case that could be 
construed as a conﬂict between a deontic rule and other relevant considerations. 
Moreover, a simple lexical ordering of rules would not do the trick: Depending 
on the circumstances, deontic rules have to be assigned diﬀerent degrees of 
strength, giving rise to an enormous, perhaps inﬁnite number of conﬁgurations 
to be incorporated in the rule system. If it is the case that most choices we are 
confronted with in everyday life involve more than one moral obligation, and 
if the exact weight of those obligations diﬀers from case to case, then the com-
plex moral grammar accounting for all of those complications would resemble 
a linguistic grammar that had a diﬀerent rule for almost every sentence. Thus, 
the complexity of the moral grammar would increase dramatically compared 
to Mikhail’s original proposal, making it doubtful that such a system could be 
stored by the ﬁnite capacity of the human brain. The point is not that the most 
accurate formulation of the moral grammar cannot include speciﬁcations that 
limit or describe the application of deontic rules in speciﬁc circumstances.24 
Rather, the lesson is that this strategy cannot solve the problem in its totality.
The challenge of explaining conﬂicts of duties brings out a trilemma in 
Mikhail’s theory. These are the three commitments that follow from his view:
(1)  the ‘traditional deductive model of moral judgment’ (Mikhail 2013, 19) 
expressed in his schema of moral reasoning,
(2)  a moral grammar whose content is simple enough to be stored by the 
ﬁnite cognitive capacities of the human brain, and
(3)  a system of deontic rules that is complete insofar as it explains all moral 
judgments.
The ﬁrst claim is a commitment that Mikhail makes explicitly (see above). The 
second claim is an assumption that he is implicitly committed to: Insofar as the 
moral grammar is the result of analysing the actual judgments of mature agents, 
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it must be within the grasp of our mental capacities. The analogy between 
linguistics and morality motivates the third claim: Just as linguistics aims to 
uncover the basic rules of the generative grammar that underlies our linguistic 
competence, it is the goal of the linguistic analogy to explain our ability to 
make moral judgments, and this does not allow for areas of moral discourse 
that remain unaccounted for by the theory.
If, as argued above, the traditional deductive model of moral judgment 
entails that no further mental operation beyond the application of the deontic 
rule to a situation is necessary for reaching a moral verdict (ﬁrst commitment), 
and if the moral grammar covers all possible complications (third commitment), 
then the second commitment cannot be maintained since the resulting system 
of rules would exceed our mental limitations. This, however, would defeat the 
very purpose of the moral grammar hypothesis. Instead, either the ﬁrst or the 
third claim has to be rejected. Rejecting the third claim would save the theory, 
but also at a very high cost: If only a fairly limited range of cases would be cov-
ered by the hypothesis, this limited explanatory power wouldn’t suﬃce for a 
general account of moral intuitions. However, then there would be no uniﬁed 
explanation of the rule system that underlies widely held moral judgments, a 
core goal of Mikhail’s theory. The least costly option, it seems, is to dismiss the 
ﬁrst claim. Even though Mikhail is committed to it, seeing himself as executing a 
research program envisioned by a long tradition of thinkers (Mikhail 2013, 28),25 
the claim is contrary to deep-seated beliefs about the nature of morality that 
are hard to reconcile with the idea that our moral intuitions could be generated 
(possibly in a superior way) by machines executing a moral code. As a matter 
of fact, the idea that we often need to weigh morally relevant facts against one 
another without having a rule that determines in advance how to do so seems 
so ﬁrmly embedded in common sense that it is hard to accept that we even 
need empirical evidence for this claim.26 I will therefore pursue the option of 
rejecting the ﬁrst claim and consider what follows from this for the nature of 
moral deliberation.
The reason for the overbearing complexity of the moral grammar in the case 
where the ﬁrst and third claim are taken to be correct is that the system of rules 
needs to simultaneously provide two kinds of information: Given a description 
of a situation, an agent in possession of the moral grammar knows (a) what 
morally relevant features count in favour of or against the action and (b) what 
their relative strength is. Compared to the information that a rule speaks in 
favour of or against an action, codiﬁcation of how the rule interacts with other 
morally relevant factors is far more complex. To reduce this complexity, a natural 
move would be to give up the goal of ﬁnding a rule system that can determine 
the weight of each morally relevant consideration in advance. Instead, this task 
could be performed by a judgment about the relative weight of the morally 
relevant factors that bear on a situation that cannot be captured by a codiﬁed 
system.27
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As a result, we should revise Mikhail’s understanding of moral deliberation as 
a ‘logically closed system’ (Mikhail 2011, 124) and make room for the application 
of moral judgment. The revision takes the following form:
Prima facie reason P applies to A = A has features F1 … Fn.
Prima face reason Q applies to A = A has features F1x … Fnx.
…
Agent X assigns a relative weight to prima facie reasons P, Q, …
Agent X determines the all-things-considered judgment.
A has deontic status D.
In case only one prima facie reason bears on a situation, there is no need for 
the exercise of moral judgment, as the all-things-considered judgment about 
the moral permissibility of the action follows directly. Mikhail’s trolley cases fall 
into this cate-gory.
This model oﬀers distinct advantages over Mikhail’s picture. If Ross is right, 
at least in principle, and the number of irreducible prima facie duties is small, 
the complete moral grammar does not face the challenge of being too compli-
cated to be accommodated by a limited cognitive system. In addition, once all 
fundamental moral considerations have been added to the moral grammar, this 
relatively sparse technical apparatus can explain a much wider range of cases 
than Mikhail’s original theory (which was only designed to account for a small 
number of trolley cases). And pace Mikhail, this theory does not support the 
implausible claim that complex and context-sensitive moral judgments can be 
reduced to an algorithm executable by a machine.
In contrast to Mikhail’s other claims, his rejection of fundamental moral prin-
ciples as prima facie duties is not necessitated by the empirical evidence. Even 
though this rejection is compatible with Mikhail’s empirical work – the cases 
he considers are designed in such a way that a single moral principle explains 
them, and therefore they don’t commit him to a stance regarding more complex 
situations where several duties apply – the view that there is only one principle 
that bears on each situation is a deliberate choice that expresses his theoret-
ical preferences. As such, the disagreement between the two views has to be 
resolved through non-empirical means such as an appeal to common sense. 
Here Ross’s view has, as I have just shown, more plausibility. This places the 
burden on Mikhail to demonstrate that the advantages of his view outweigh 
the apparent advantage of Ross’s theory. Hence, the fact that Ross’s view corre-
sponds to deep-seated intuitions about the nature of fundamental moral prin-
ciples gives us strong reason to adopt his position regarding prima facie duties.
11. Conclusion
Is Rossian intuitionism an empirically adequate theory? In light of the preced-
ing discussion, intuitionists are entitled to a qualiﬁed positive answer. Some of 
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Ross’s empirical assumptions have straightforwardly been vindicated: Mikhail’s 
study has provided new evidence that mature moral agents rely on the same 
fundamental morally relevant features (Ross’s ﬁrst assumption). Further, there 
is a plurality of basic morally relevant features (Ross’s second assumption). It is a 
matter of debate whether these features can be expressed in the form of prima 
facie duties (Ross’s third assumption), but as I have shown above, it is reasonable 
to expect that further studies might reveal that, pace Mikhail, moral principles 
have to be weighed against each other. It is also a matter of dispute whether 
agents can gain knowledge of prima facie duties (Ross’s fourth assumption). 
Finally, the divergence between Ross’s and Mikhail’s lists of duties can mostly be 
explained by their diﬀerent theoretical goals. In case some divergences remain 
even after the diﬀerence in goals has been taken into account, Rossian intuition-
ists would most likely have to revise those parts of their theory.
Two further lessons emerge from this discussion. First, as a general theme, 
an empirically adequate picture of morality cannot easily be read from the data, 
but relies on implicit assumptions that are philosophical rather than empirical in 
nature: What kinds of scenarios would be philosophically interesting and should 
therefore be examined through empirical testing? What should we expect peo-
ple to know? What is the nature of moral deliberation? The second lesson follows 
from the ﬁrst: Not only do the empirical predictions of Rossian intuitionism need 
to be measured against Mikhail’s empirical study, but Mikhail’s analysis can also 
be improved by paying attention to Ross’s theory, as the previous discussion 
about the nature of moral reasoning about duties has shown.
As is the nature of any theory that relies on common sense, ethical intuition-
ism is situated at the intersection between two forms of inquiry. In order to be 
convincing, Rossian intuitionists not only have to defend the conceptual claim 
that moral principles are self-evident and that this fact gives warrant to those 
principles; they also need to demonstrate that the content of their normative 
theory explains the actual well-considered moral judgments of mature agents. 
Recent ﬁndings in empirical moral psychology have signiﬁcantly improved our 
understanding of this question, and future research will certainly continue to do 
so. It might seem unsatisfactory that, as a result, the intuitionist project of for-
mulating an ethics based on common sense morality remains open to challenge 
from empirical disciplines. However, this should not be taken as a weakness of 
the theory. Quite the opposite, being true to theory and practice is a virtue that 
sets intuitionism apart from its competitors.
Notes
1.  In this paper, I will limit my discussion to the kind of intuitionism that is developed 
by W. D. Ross. Therefore, unless speciﬁed otherwise I will use the term ‘intuitionism’ 
to denote Ross’s version of the theory. I will also only be concerned with Ross’s 
deontic theory and will ignore his axiological views.
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2.  Ross does not use ‘induction’ in the enumerative sense according to which our 
conﬁdence increases with sample size. Rather, he describes it in his commentary 
on Aristotle as ‘the process whereby after experience of a certain number of 
particular instances the mind grasps a universal truth which then and afterwards 
is seen to be self-evident’ (Ross 1977, 223). For an application of this Aristotelian 
theory to his own moral epistemology, see Ross (1930, 32f.) and Ross (1939, 170).
3.  Audi argues that by understanding a self-evident proposition, we apprehend its 
relation to abstract entities (Audi 2013, 167). Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014) 
make the case that certain moral statements (‘moral ﬁxed points’) are a species 
of conceptual truth. Stratton-Lake (2014) proposes that what justiﬁes self-evident 
propositions is not the fact that we understand them in a certain way; while this 
is necessary for getting a clear grasp of the proposition at stake, the fact that it 
seems true to us does the justiﬁcatory work.
4.  There is a valid worry that in order for the appeal to well-considered judgments of 
mature agents to have evidentiary weight, there must be a neutral characterization 
of moral maturity. Otherwise, the intuitionist could simply pick those kinds of 
agents whose judgments mirror her own pre-theoretical convictions. Fear and 
disgust, for example, are by some taken to be a reliable moral guide (which might 
lead to intuitions about duties towards one’s family, culture or nation), while 
Rossian intuitionists might consider this a distorting inﬂuence and rather focus on 
the intuitions of calm and reﬂective agents. If there is no non-question-begging 
way to choose one kind of moral maturity over another, the worry goes, the 
intuitions of one’s preferred kind of mature agents cannot speak in favour or 
against a normative theory. A defender of Ross’s theory has two replies. First, 
he can point out that many of the prima facie duties on Ross’s list would result 
from most plausible conceptions of moral maturity. It is in fact hard to imagine 
what kind of mature agent would deny that we have prima facie duties to keep 
promises, not to injure others or to beneﬁt others if possible (I am leaving aside 
more contentious items on Ross’s list, such as his duty to self-improvement; 
acceptance of those rules is not necessary for being a Rossian intuitionist. 
Contemporary defenders of Rossian intuitionism such as Robert Audi omit them 
as well (see Audi 2004, 161–196). The question then becomes whether there are 
considerations beyond those on Ross’s list that should also be included. Here, 
intuitionists could argue that obligations such as those towards one’s family or 
nation are not proper candidates for the list of prima facie duties because they 
are not basic and can be derived from the items already on the list. Ross himself 
makes use of such an argument when he tries to show that duties towards one’s 
country follow from the prima facie duties of gratitude and ﬁdelity (see Ross 1930, 
27f.). Hence, Ross oﬀers a thin normative theory consisting merely of basic moral 
considerations which is compatible with various substantive normative views (see 
Ross 1930, 30). I thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
5.  In line with this claim, Ross (1930, 23) explicitly allows for the possibility that there 
are prima facie duties that he has overlooked. Railton (1986, 206) also argues 
that the ethical intuitionist needs to provide an epistemological account that is 
‘psychologically plausible’.
6.  Ross (1930, 23): ‘It is a prima facie classiﬁcation of the duties which reﬂection on 
our moral convictions seems actually to reveal. And if these convictions are, as I 
would claim that they are, of the nature of knowledge, and if I have not misstated 
them, the list will be a list of authentic conditional duties …’, and ‘[t] he account we 
have given above corresponds (it seems to me) better than either of the simpler 
theories with what we really think …’ (19).
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7.  Chomskyan linguistics also addresses the question of how knowledge of a 
language is acquired (the theory of universal grammar) and the issue of how 
the knowledge of language is put to use (the theory of linguistic performance). 
For present purposes, I set those problems aside.
8.  Other notable related work includes Harman and Roedder (n.d.), Hauser (2006), 
Hauser, Young, and Cushman (2008), and Dwyer (2007).
9.  The only other philosopher that I am aware of who has considered the application 
of Chomskyan linguistics to intuitionism is Hare. However, Hare quickly dismisses 
the idea: In Hare’s narrow construction of the analogy, Chomsky’s focus on the 
structural features of language is of no use for intuitionism since it can only 
illuminate the structure of moral language and not its content (Hare 1997, 85–87). 
This is not a conclusive objection. The linguistic analogy does not require that all 
of Chomsky’s distinctions need to carry over to the moral realm. As I show below, 
a case can be made that both form and content are part of the moral grammar.
10.  As discussed below, the distinction between operative and express principles 
might be more strongly supported in linguistics than in moral psychology.
11.  While it is true that in Trolley cases, we are presented with a choice between 
two possible actions (saving five vs. killing one), the best interpretation of our 
intuitive responses to those scenarios according to Mikhail is not that we weigh 
competing claims against each other, but that we unconsciously analyse the 
structural features of those situations and then apply (depending on the variation 
of the Trolley case) e.g. a version of the doctrine of double eﬀect. See Mikhail 
(2011, chapter 5).
12.  This is in line with Ross, who is also interested in what isolated morally relevant 
features there are, and not in the disagreements that result when diﬀerent people 
weigh them diﬀerently.
13.  Most participants come from the United States or other Western nations. See 
Mikhail (2011, 331).
14.  See Mikhail (2011, 319–360), especially 339f.; for a critical discussion of this worry, 
see Enoch (2013, 10).
15.  For the purpose of keeping the presentation of Mikhail’s theory as short as 
possible, I abstain from describing the relevant cases.
16.  The principle helps to explain why variations of trolley cases where a bystander 
has the chance of saving a man from colliding with a trolley by throwing him oﬀ 
the track and hurting him in the process are commonly judged as permissible.
17.  Mikhail (2011, 124).
18.  In line with the foregoing discussion, Hauser et al. (2007) conclude in a study on 
whether moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning that while subjects 
generally failed to provide justiﬁcations that could account for the pattern of 
their judgments (15), a minority of subjects were able to do so.
19.  Audi, who sees himself in the tradition of Ross, argues for a list of ten prima facie 
duties that go beyond Ross’s list and also includes items such as the enhancement 
and preservation of freedom and respectfulness (Audi 2004, 187–196).
20.  See the discussion in Ross (1930, 17) of why consequentialism fails to explain 
cases where promises play a role.
21.  Even philosophers who are otherwise sympathetic towards Mikhail’s research 
program reject this aspect of his theory. For example, Adam Smith, whom 
defenders of the moral grammar hypothesis consider a precursor of their view, 
believed that rules alone are insuﬃcient for arriving at moral judgments. After 
suggesting an analogy between the rules of grammar and justice in the previously 
quoted passage, he claims that ‘there are no rules by the knowledge of which 
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we can infallibly be taught to act upon all occasions with prudence, with just 
magnanimity, or proper beneﬁcence’ (Smith[1759] 2002, 205).
22.  For a similar idea, see (McKeever and Ridge 2006, 25–45).
23.  Mikhail (2013, 18): ‘[O] ne can always supplement a theory with one or more 
‘unless clauses’ or auxiliary hypotheses to handle putative counterexamples’.
24.  Cases of self-defence provide a good example where a speciﬁcation might solve 
the issue with the doctrine of double eﬀect. It does not seem that the fact that 
I am allowed to kill the attacker if necessary as a means to saving my life is the 
result of a weighing of the doctrine of double eﬀect against my right to self-
defence. Rather, the fact that I am attacked silences competing considerations 
that count against my right of self-defence, and this might be incorporated into 
the formulation of the doctrine.
25.  Bernard Williams, on the other hand, is more sceptical about the claim that this 
position has had many friends in the history of philosophy. See Williams (1995, 
184).
26.  Further, the existence of duties that pull in diﬀerent directions provides a plausible 
explanation of moral regret, a phenomenon that Mikhail’s theory cannot easily 
explain.
27.  In his contribution to the discussion about the computational theory of mind, 
Hubert Dreyfus has argued that parts of our mental operation, especially those 
having to do with expert knowledge, cannot be captured by an algorithmic 
procedure. See Dreyfus (1972).
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